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AN OFFER OF FIRM RESETTLEMENT
ROBERT

I.

D.

SLOANE*

INTRODUCTION

The Attorney General lacks discretion to grant asylum to any refugee "if, prior to arrival in the United States, he or she entered
into another nation with, or while in that nation received, an offer
of permanent resident status, citizenship, or some other type of
permanent resettlement."1 This rule, the doctrine of firm resettlement, is unique among the mandatory bars to asylum in the United
States. It does not reflect a societal judgment about the moral fitness of an asylum applicant's character-as, for example, does the
bar that prohibits granting asylum to persons with a history of violent criminal behavior.2 Nor does it reflect a societal judgment of
policy-as, for example, do the bars that prohibit asylum to persons who may represent a risk to the health or security of the U.S.
citizenry.3 The bar to asylum for refugees firmly resettled in third
states rather originates in the international definition of a refugee,
or more precisely, in the potential for the facts that constitute firm
resettlement to disqualify an otherwise eligible refugee from
asylum.
That, in any event, is the nature and theory of firm resettlement.
In practice, it has sometimes become something very different: a
regulatory loophole by which the Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS or Service) 4 attempts to remove refugees with other* Clerk to Judge Gerard E. Lynch, United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York. J.D., Yale 2000. The author acknowledges with gratitude the comments of Professor W. Michael Reisman and Elizabeth Brundige.
1. 8 C.F.R. § 208.15 (2003); see Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952,
§ 208(b) (2) (vi), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b) (2) (A) (vi) (2003) (denying asylum to persons "firmly
resettled in another country"); 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(c) (2) (i) (B) (2003).
2. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(c)(2)(i)(A) (2003); see also8 C.F.R. § 208.13(c)(2)(i)(E) (2003)
(denying asylum to those who "ordered, incited or otherwise participated in the persecution" of individuals with specific characteristics).
3. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(c) (2) (i) (C) (2003).
4. Since the preparation of this Article, the new Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services (BCIS) of the Department of Homeland Security has assumed responsibility
for the initial stages of the asylum process. It remains too early to tell what effects, if any,
this institutional reorganization will have, though it seems unlikely that the practice of the
BCIS toward asylum seekers will differ materially from that of the INS on the issue of firm
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wise valid persecution claims. At times, too, firm resettlement
becomes a pretext for denying asylum to refugees thought to have
chosen to seek sanctuary in the United States for economic reasons. The reason for this divergence between theory and practice
lies partly with the Service. Asylum officers and INS trial attorneys
sometimes seize upon firm resettlement as the sole available and
colorable argument to advance in the face of otherwise valid asylum applications. But the fault also lies partly with the judiciary,
which has misconstrued the firm-resettlement bar in a manner that
enables its misuse or misapplication. In this Comment I aspire to
explain how and why.
Part II examines the historical and legal evolution of the firmresettlement bar. Part III contrasts the prevailing judicial interpretation-the totality-of-the-circumstances test-with the Third Circuit's recent decision in Abdille v. Ashcroft, 5 which, I argue,
articulated a standard that manifests greater fidelity to the statutory
and regulatory text, as well as to the purpose, of the firm-resettlement bar. Part IV shows, by way of two examples, how the predominant judicial approach enables, indeed may encourage, its
misapplication. In short, dated administrative and judicial precedents establish that firm-resettlement inquiries require acutely factsensitive and discretionary judgments. Those precedents often fail
to appreciate the significance of the federal government's redefinition of firm resettlement as a mandatory rather than a discretionary bar to asylum. Because the INS frequently resorts to a variety of
non-offer-based factors in an effort to establish a prima facie case
of firm resettlement-and because, more often than not, immigration judges set the bar of "clarity and force" 6 to which this evidence
must rise in order to compel the asylum applicant to disprove firm
resettlement at an unduly low level-firm resettlement effectively
becomes, not a bar to asylum for otherwise qualified refugees, but
an additional criterion for refugee status. The applicant then bears
the burden to show the absence of firm resettlement in order to
establish his or her eligibility for asylum.
This pattern of events reflects a misapplication of the law. In
practice, it also operates to burden bona fide asylum seekers
unduly and to waste administrative and judicial resources that
would be better spent focusing on the paramount question in every
resettlement. For the sake of clarity and consistency with the cited case law, I refer throughout this Comment to the INS rather than the BCIS.
5. 242 F.3d 477 (3d Cir. 2001).
6. Id. at 486-87 (citing Cheo v. INS, 162 F.3d 1227 (9th Cir. 1998)).
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asylum case: the applicant's claim to refugee status. Firm resettlement should no longer be understood as one among many factors
to be weighed by an adjudicator in the exercise of discretion. Discretion, to the extent that it continues to play any valid role in firmresettlement determinations, should be far more constrained. To
exercise that limited discretion appropriately requires an appreciation of both the objective of firm resettlement and the significance
of its statutory redefinition as a mandatory bar. For these reasons, I
conclude by emphasizing that unless and until Congress expresses
a contrary intent, the doctrine of firm resettlement must be construed to conform to the paramount objective of international refugee law established by the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status
of Refugees 7 and its 1967 Protocol:" to establish a robust regime of
international protection for certain defined categories of persons
deprived of genuine national protection.
II.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE FIRM-RESETTLEMENT BAR

A.

InternationalFramework

The doctrine of firm resettlement originates in the international
definition of a refugee set forth in the 1951 Convention Relating to
the Status of Refugees. The 1951 Convention, augmented in scope
and application by the 1967 Protocol (collectively, Refugee Conventions), establishes the basic international framework for the
protection of asylum seekers. Article I expressly excludes from the
definition of a refugee, first, any "person who is recognized by the
competent authorities of the country in which he has taken residence as having the rights and obligations which are attached to
the possession of the nationality of that country";9 and second, any
person who, though once a refugee, "has acquired a new nationality, and enjoys the protection of the country of his new nationality." 10 These provisions reflect the central intention of the Refugee
Conventions: to create an international regime that shields persons
deprived of the rights and protections that national citizenship
ordinarily affords. The legal doctrine of firm resettlement reflects
7.

Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150

[hereinafter Refugee Convention].

8. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606
U.N.T.S. 267 [hereinafter 1967 Protocol].
9.

10.

Refugee Convention, supra note 7, art. I(E), 189 U.N.T.S. at 154.

Id. art. I(C)(3), 189 U.N.T.S. at 156.
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the simple factual judgment that "[n]ational protection and status
in a third country negate the need for international protection."'1 I
But what degree of national protection in a third country, precisely which "rights and obligations," suffice to remove a person
from the Refugee Conventions' protection? The Handbook of the
U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) provides some
guidance. A third state need not grant a person formal citizenship,
as provided in Article I(c) (3); it is enough that he or she receives
"most of the rights normally enjoyed by nationals," which means, at
12
a minimum, "protection against deportation or expulsion." Article I(E) of the 1951 Convention, however, is subject to a far more
expansive interpretation. One Canadian court, for example, held
3
that it reaches so far as to encompass the right to social services.'
At the same time, the municipal laws of states parties suggest that
the Refugee Conventions do authorize exclusion of otherwise qualified refugees who have received some form of protected status in a
third state that falls short of full citizenship. South African law, for
instance, provides that a person does not qualify as a refugee if
"there is reason to believe that he or she ... enjoys the protection
14
of any other country in which he or she has taken residence."
Article I(E) does "not require that the individuals in question
should enjoy the full range of rights incidental to citizenship.
Given the fundamental objective of protection, however, the right
of entry to the State and freedom from removal are to be considered essential."' 15 Beyond this, international law provides little guidance about the nature and extent of the national protection and
rights required by Article I(E).

11. DEBORAH E. ANKER, LAw OF ASYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES 447 (3d ed., 1999).
12. Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, Handbook on Procedures and
Criteriafor Determining Refugee Status Under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating
144, 145, U.N. Doc. HCR/PRO/4 (1979) [hereinafter UNHCR
to the Status of Refugees,
Handbook].
13. See Hamdan v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), 38 Imm. L.R.
(2d) 20 (1997). In Hamdan, the Federal Court of Canada reversed and remanded the
Canadian Refugee Board's exclusion of an Iraqi citizen, who had spent several years studying in the Philippines, under Article 1 (E) of the Refugee Convention (as incorporated into
the Canadian Immigration Act). Id. While the Federal Court acknowledged that the applicant could return to the Philippines, where he enjoyed the rights to reside permanently
and to travel, it held that the "rights and obligations" referred to by Article 1 (E) also
include the rights to work and receive social services. See id. 1 7.
14. Refugees Act, 1998, Act No. 130, art. 4 (GG) (S. Mr.).
15. Guy S. GOODWIN-GILL, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 94 (2d ed. 1996).
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B.
1.

The Doctrine of Firm Resettlement in U.S. Law

Evolution of the Firm-Resettlement Bar

In the United States, Article I(E) would appear to undergird the
firm-resettlement bar to asylum. In fact, the doctrine developed
well before the United States implemented the 1967 Protocol in
1980. It evolved in a series of decisions by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA or Board) in the late 1960s. At issue in these
cases was the status of Chinese asylum seekers who had fled communist China in the aftermath of its civil war, but then resided for
some time in another state or sovereign territory (typically Hong
16
Kong) before seeking asylum in the United States.
The Supreme Court first addressed this issue in Rosenberg v. Yee
Chien Woo.1 7 The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) at that
time provided preferential treatment to aliens fleeing persecution
in communist states.' 8 Yee, a refugee from communist China, fled
to Hong Kong in 1953 and remained there until 1959. He then
traveled to the United States on business. Upon the expiration of
his visitor's visa, Yee applied for an immigrant visa, claiming preference under the INA as an alien who had fled a communist state.1 9
The Court declined to decide whether Yee's residence and status
in Hong Kong, as a matter of fact, constituted firm resettlement. 20
But the Court rejected the Ninth Circuit's decision, which had
16. Matter of Ng, 12 1. & N. Dec. 411 (BIA 1967) (denying the asylum application of a
Chinese refugee on the grounds that he held permanent resident status in Hong Kong,
where he had attended school and his father owned a business); Matter of Chai, 12 1. & N.
Dec. 81 (BIA 1967) (granting the asylum application of a Chinese refugee who had resided
in Hong Kong for five years after fleeing China because he did not enjoy in Hong Kong
"any right or privileges ... inconsistent with refugee status"); Matter of Moy, 12 I. & N.
Dec. 117 (BIA 1967) (denying the asylum application of a Chinese refugee who had
acquired permanent resident status in Colombia, where he also owned a partnership interest in a business); Matter of Sun, 12 I. & N. Dec. 36 (BIA 1966) (denying the asylum
application of a Chinese refugee who had resided in Taiwan for many years after fleeing
China and in fact acquired Taiwanese citizenship). For a discussion of the INS's application of firm-resettlement doctrine to deny asylum to Chinese refugees who resided in
Hong Kong prior to its reversion to Chinese sovereignty, see Frannie S. Mok, Chinese Asylum Applications Under U.S. ImmigrationPolicy: "FirmResettlement" in Hong Kong, 17 HASTINGS
INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 183 (1993).

17. 402 U.S. 49 (1971).
18. See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, § 203(a) (7), Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66
Stat. 163 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)) [hereinafter INA]. The Refugee Act
of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8
U.S.C.) [hereinafter Refugee Act], amended the INA.
19. See Yee Chien Woo, 402 U.S. at 50-51.
20. See id. at 57 n.6 (declining to express an opinion on the district court's finding
that Yee had not, as a matter of fact, firmly resettled in Hong Kong). Yee possessed identity
papers enabling him to return to and reside permanently in Hong Kong. Id. at 56 n.5.
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held that, as a matter of law, firm resettlement is irrelevant to an
21
asylum application.
The Court made clear, to the contrary, that firm resettlement is
"one of the factors" that the INS must consider "to determine
whether a refugee seeks asylum in this country as a consequence of
his flight to avoid persecution."' 22 This construction of congressional intent, the Court emphasized, conformed to the "central
theme" of refugee legislation: the creation of a safe haven for refugees still in flight from persecution, not those already resettled and
rebuilding their lives elsewhere. Justice Black explained that Congress could not have "intended to make refugees in flight from persecution compete with all of the world's resettled refugees for the
10,200 entries and permits afforded each year under [§]
203(a) (7). Such an interpretation would subvert the lofty goals
23
embodied in the whole pattern of our refugee legislation."
The decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in Chinese American Civic Council v. Attorney Genera 24 reaffirmed this approach. Again, the case involved Chinese
refugees who had resided for many years in Hong Kong before
seeking asylum in the United States, and again, the key to the
court's decision rested on its finding that the individuals in question could no longer claim the status of refugees "in flight."2 5 In
the court's view, too much time had elapsed between the refugees'
initial flight from China and the submission of their asylum applications. But the D.C. Circuit clarified that while it proved dispositive in Chinese American Civic Council, length of residency in a third
state should not be deemed the sole factor relevant to a firm resettlement decision. 2 6 Judge Kaufmann, concurring, emphasized that
contrary to the standard applied by the INS, "long residence" alone
21. See Yee Chien Woo v. Rosenberg, 419 F.2d 252, 254 (9th Cir. 1969) ("Whether
appellee was firmly resettled in Hong Kong is not, then, relevant."), rev'd, 402 U.S. 49
(1971). The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the conflict between this decision
and Shen v. Esperdy, 428 F.2d 293 (2d Cir. 1970).
22.

Yee Chien Woo, 402 U.S. at 56.

23.
24.

Id.; accord Shen v. Esperdy, 428 F.2d 293 (2d Cir. 1970).
566 F.2d 321 (D.C. Cir. 1977).

25. Id. at 328; see also Kai Fun Chan v. Kiley, 454 F. Supp. 34 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)
(affirming denial of Chinese refugee's asylum application, on the grounds that he lived,
attended school, and worked in Hong Kong for four years and held permanent resident
status there).
26. Chinese Am. Civic Council, 566 F.2d at 328 n.18 (noting that an applicant's "family
ties, intent, business or property connections and other matters" may be relevant to the
factual determination whether a refugee remains "in flight").
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should not create an "irrebuttable presumption" of firm
27
resettlement.
In short, these decisions-rendered before the United States
implemented its treaty obligations under the Refugee Conventions
by domestic legislation-established, first, that firm resettlement is
relevant to the disposition of an asylum claim, but second, that to
determine whether a refugee has in fact been firmly resettled, an
asylum officer or immigration judge should consider the totality of
the circumstances. No one factor should be viewed as dispositive.
Above all, the inquiry in every case must be whether, in view of the
applicant's legal status and circumstances, the refugee remains "in
flight," unable to avail himself of the effective protection of some
third state.
2.

The Refugee Act of 1980

In 1968, the United States ratified the 1967 Protocol and, by its
incorporation of the substantive provisions of the 1951 Convention, for the first time expressly assumed international obligations
toward refugees. Not until 1980, however, did Congress enact comprehensive legislation intended to implement these obligations.
The Refugee Act of 1980 accomplished this objective by restructuring and codifying the asylum process. 28 Section 208 of the INA
incorporated the 1951 Convention's definition of a refugee and
vested the Attorney General with discretion to grant asylum to refugees, so defined. 29 It did not, however, codify any bar to asylum
seekers deemed firmly resettled. While § 207 of the INA, which
concerns the admission of refugees outside the United States, provided that the "Attorney General may... admit any refugee who is
not firmly resettled in any foreign country,"3 0 § 208, which concerns the admission of asylum seekers at the border or already resident in the United States, contained no analogous provision.
Federal regulations promulgated pursuant to § 208 nonetheless
defined firm resettlement and instructed INS district directors to
deny asylum to any alien found to be firmly resettled. 31 In several
27. Id. at 332 (Kaufmann, J., concurring).
28. See generally INA § 208, 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (setting forth the processes for aliens to
seek asylum).
29. See id. § 208(b).
30. Id. § 207(c)(1).
31. 8 C.F.R. § 208.14 (1980) ("An alien is considered to be 'firmly resettled' if he was
offered resident status, citizenship, or some other type of permanent resettlement by
another nation and traveled to and entered that nation as a consequence of his flight from
persecution, unless the refugee establishes ....that the conditions of his residence in that
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early decisions, the BIA suggested that this bar also extended to
limit the discretion of immigration judges. 3 2 In Matter of Lam, 33 for
example, the Board concluded that despite the omission of an
express reference to firm resettlement in the Refugee Act, "the
inclusion in the new legislation of the firm resettlement doctrine is
consistent with past recognition of the doctrine and its importance." 3 4 The Board's rationale in Lam essentially echoed that of
the Supreme Court in Yee Chien Woo. "Firm resettlement," the
Board wrote, "has long been part of our laws relating to refugees";
35
it is "inherent in the 'central theme'" of refugee legislation.
Applying this implicit doctrine in Matter of Portales,3 6 the BIA
denied asylum to a group of Cuban refugees determined to be
firmly resettled in Peru. The Board acknowledged the hardships
the applicants faced there, but said that "[the living conditions
and inability to obtain employment experienced by the applicants
appear related to Peru's economy, rather than [to] the conscious
restriction of benefits by the authorities of that country." 37 By
emphasizing "conscious restriction," the BIA adopted the regulatory definition that limited the discretion of the INS to grant asylum to firmly resettled refugees. Thereafter, it seemed, the same
standard would limit the discretion of immigration judges. 38
3.

The Board's Decision in Soleimani

The Board reversed course and rejected this view in Matter of
Soleimani.39 There, an Iranian Jew applied for asylum in the United
States after residing for almost one year in Israel, where she
attended language classes and recovered from a bout of pneumonia that required hospitalization. Israel's "Law of Return" appeared
automatically to extend an offer of permanent residence and citizenship to any Jew. But Soleimani did not ask for, nor did the
Israeli government expressly offer her, any such status. The immination were so substantially and consciously restricted by the authority of the country of
asylum/refuge that he was not in fact resettled."); 8 C.F.R. § 208.8(f) (1) (ii) (1980)
(instructing INS district directors to deny asylum to aliens "firmly resettled in a foreign
country").
32. Matter of Portales, 18 I. & N. Dec. 239 (BIA 1982); Matter of Lam, 18 I. & N. Dec.
15 (BIA 1981).
33. 18 I. & N. Dec. 15 (BIA 1981).
34. Id. at 19.
35. Id. (quoting Rosenberg v. Yee Chien Woo, 402 U.S. 49, 55 (1971)).
36. 18 I. & N. Dec. 239 (BIA 1982).
37. Id. at 242 (emphasis added).
38. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.14 (1980).
39. 20 I. & N. Dec. 99 (BIA 1989).
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gration judge nonetheless found that, by virtue of Israeli law, she
had received an implicit offer of permanent residence and therefore had been firmly resettled under the definition then set forth
in 8 C.F.R. § 208.14, rendering her ineligible for asylum in the
40
United States.
The BIA overruled this decision and declared Soleimani eligible
for asylum. First, the BIA held that the regulation instructing INS
district directors to deny asylum to applicants found firmly resettled should be construed literally to apply solely to INS district
directors; it should not be construed to constrain the discretion of
immigration judges. 4 1 Consistent with Yee Chien Woo, 4 2 firm resettlement would remain but one factor to be considered in the exercise
of discretion. 43 Yet at the same time, the Board agreed that a finding of firm resettlement ordinarily carried negative discretionary
weight and would bar asylum in the absence of countervailing equities. 44 Second, the Board explained, an offer of firm resettlement
must be concrete. It does not mean that an applicant may have
been able to avail herself of resettlement procedures in a third
state; it means an actual and specific resettlement offer. 45 The existence of Israel's Law of Return therefore did not, by itself, constitute an offer of permanent resettlement.
40. See id. at 100-02.
41. See id. at 104 (citing Matter of Gonzalez 19 I. & N. Dec. 682 (1988) (holding that
the BIA and immigration judges are not bound by the analogous provision of the Federal
Regulations that bars asylum to those individuals found guilty of a serious crime pursuant
to a final judgment)).
42. 402 U.S. 49 (1972).
43. Soleimani, 20 I. & N. Dec., at 103 (citing Matter of Pula, 19 I. & N. Dec. 467, 474
(1987) (holding that in exercising discretion with regard to an asylum application, "the
totality of the circumstances and actions of an alien in his flight from the country where he
fears persecution should be examined"), superseded by regulation as stated in Adriasian v. INS
180 F.3d. 1033, 1043-44 (9th Cir. 1999)).
44. Id. at 105; see also Farbakhsh v. INS, 20 F.3d 877, 881 (8th Cir. 1994) (applying the
pre-1990 standard to deny, in the exercise of discretion, asylum to an Iranian applicant
held to have been firmly resettled in Spain); accord Barou-Barukoff v. INS, No. 91-70440,
1993 IL 5173, at *3 (9th Cir. Jan. 11, 1993) (finding, under the pre-1990 discretionary
standard set forth in Soleimani, that a Bulgarian refugee had been firmly resettled in
Belgium and noting that, however sincere and credible, his "other [anti-communist and
anti-drug] activities did not present compelling countervailing equities").
45. See ANKER, supra note 11, at 450 (noting that, under the rule established by
Soleimani, "an offer [of firm resettlement] cannot be merely theoretical or inchoate"). But
see Tsatourian v. INS, No. 96-70804, 1997 WL 800915, at *1 (9th Cir. Dec. 31, 1997)
(upholding the BIA's denial of asylum to an Azerbaijani refugee alleged to have been
firmly resettled in Armenia because, among other things, the U.S. State Department issued
an advisory opinion stating that the "Government of Armenia has offered residence permits to refugees from Azerbaijan proper, who are assumed to be permanent residents of
Armenia").
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Third, the Board reiterated the theme of Yee Chien Woo--a
theme that pervades modern firm resettlement decisions despite
significant changes in the law since the date of the Board's decision
in Soleimani: that the adjudicator should consider the totality of the
circumstances in order to decide whether an applicant remains in
flight from persecution and unable to resettle in a third state that
offers her rights and protections tantamount to those of citizenship. Finally, the Board explained that where physical presence in
the United States is "a consequence of" or "reasonably proximate
to" flight from persecution, the fact of intervening residence in a
46
third state does not alone establish firm resettlement.
Soleimani established a relatively detailed and coherent framework to guide firm-resettlement decisions by asylum officers and
immigration judges. It accomplished this by offering a well-reasoned interpretation of the law as it then stood. Soleimani remains
good law today in most respects, and it continues to exercise a
strong and for the most part positive influence on firm-resettlement decisions. The regulatory and statutory regime, however, has
changed in a crucial respect since the Board's decision in Soleimani;
specifically, firm resettlement is no longer part of the exercise of
47
discretion.
4.

Regulatory and Statutory Modifications

In 1990, new federal regulations recategorized firm resettlement
as a mandatory ground for denying asylum to otherwise eligible
refugees, applicable to asylum officers and immigration judges
alike. 4 8 These regulations effectively "overruled" Soleimani to the
extent that the Board had held that immigration judges should
consider firm resettlement as a discretionary factor. In Yang v.
INS,49 the Ninth Circuit sustained the new regulation as a valid
exercise of administrative rulemaking authority under the wellknown standard articulated by the Supreme Court in Chevron
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. 50 Then, in 1996,
46. See Soleimani, 20 I. & N. Dec., at 106, 104-05.
47. See Matter of Pula, 19 I. & N. Dec. 467 (BIA 1987).
48. See 55 Fed. Reg. 30,674, 30,678 (Jul. 27, 1990) (codified at 8 C.F.R. § 208.14
(1990)); see also 8 C.F.R. § 208.15 (1991) (setting forth the definition of firm resettlement).
The present regulations that deny asylum eligibility to refugees found "firmly resettled"
and define "firm resettlement" are set forth at, respectively, 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(c) (2) (i) (B)
(2003), and 8 C.F.R. § 208.15 (2003).
49. 79 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 1996).
50. 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984) (holding that "if the statute is silent or ambiguous with
respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's answer is
based on a permissible construction of the statute").
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as part of a package of major legislative revisions to the immigration laws, 5' Congress codified the mandatory nature of the firm52
resettlement bar.
The 1990 federal regulations modified the definition of firm
resettlement, deemphasizing the previously paramount question
whether the refugee remains in flight. While that idea, developed
in decades of case law, remained present in the background, the
new regulation reoriented the central inquiry of firm resettlement
to focus the adjudicator on the actual existence vel non of an offer
of permanent resettlement. The 1990 definition remains in force
today. 53 An asylum seeker has been firmly resettled
if, prior to arrival in the United States, he or she entered into
another country with, or while in that country received, an offer
of permanent resident status, citizenship, or some other type of permanent

resettlement unless he or she establishes:
(a) That his or her entry into that country was a necessary consequence of his or her flight from persecution [and] that he or
she remained in that country only as long as was necessary
to arrange onward travel ... ; or
(b) That the conditions of his or her residence in that country
were so substantially and consciously restrictedby the authority
of the country
of refuge that he or she was not in fact
54
resettled.
Exceptions (a) and (b) to this generally offer-based inquiry mirror the concern that has reverberated throughout firm-resettlement decisions since Yee Chien Woo: that to retain entitlement to
asylum, a refugee must remain in flight from persecution, unable
to resettle in a third state in which he can enjoy a level of rights
and protections tantamount to, if not identical with, those of citizenship. Title 8 C.F.R. § 208.15(b) also makes clear that if, despite
"an offer of permanent resettlement," a refugee denies having
been firmly resettled, an adjudicator should consider the totality of
the circumstances, including the refugee's legal status and the
actual conditions of his or her residence. 55 To facilitate that assess51. See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996
(IIRIRA), Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (codified in scattered sections of 8 & 18
U.S.C.). For an overview of IIRIRA's effect on U.S. refugee law, see generally Jaya Ramji,
LegislatingAway InternationalLaw: The Immigration Provisions of the Illegal Immigration Reform
and Immigrant Responsibility Act, 37 STAN. J. INT'L L. 117 (2001).
52. See8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(vi) (2003); Andriasian v. INS, 180 F.3d 1033, 1043
n.16 (1999).
53. See 55 Fed. Reg. 30,674, 30,683-84 Uul. 27, 1990) (codified at 8 C.F.R. § 208.15
(2003)).
54. 8 C.F.R. § 208.15 (2003) (emphasis added).
55. Id. § 208.15(b).
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ment, § 208.15(b) provides a non-exhaustive list of factors that
adjudicators "shall consider" to determine whether a refugee's conditions of residence have been "substantially and consciously
restricted" by the authorities of a third nation.5 6 These include the
rights to housing, employment, travel, public relief, education, nat57
uralization, and property.
Note, however, that the plain meaning of the regulatory text
instructs adjudicators to consider these factors only after they have
made the preliminary finding of a genuine "offer of permanent
resettlement." The totality-of-the-circumstances test does not
directly inform that question. To the contrary, it may well obfuscate the question by diverting focus from a relatively straightforward inquiry-the existence vel non of a legal offer of permanent
resettlement-to a host of extraneous factors about which, more
often than not, the adjudicator knows little. Nonetheless, in part
because of the influence of the seminal decisions of the Supreme
Court and the Board in Yee Chien Woo and Soleimani, respectively,
many decision-makers continue to apply, in effect if not name, a
modified totality-of-the-circumstances test to the logically precedent question whether a third state made an actual legal offer of
permanent resettlement.
III.

JUDICIAL APPROACHES TO

A.

FIRM RESETTLEMENT

The Totality-of-the-Circumstances Test

Since 1990, most federal courts have adopted, expressly or
implicitly, a modified totality-of-the-circumstances test. In Farbakhsh
v. INS,58 for instance, the Eighth Circuit, albeit applying the pre1990 regulations, sustained the Board's determination that an Iranian applicant had been firmly resettled in Spain. 59 Citing
Soleimani for the proposition that "[f] irm resettlement is a factor to
be considered in determining whether asylum should be granted
as a matter of discretion," 60 the Eighth Circuit emphasized the
applicant's four-year residence in Spain, where he had an application for refugee status pending; his financial support from his family; his circumvention of "orderly refugee procedures by using a
56. Id.
57. See id.
58. 20 F.3d 877 (8th Cir. 1994).
59. Id. at 882. This decision, while rendered after 1990, applied the pre-1990 regulatory regime because the applicant filed for asylum before October 1, 1990, the date on
which the mandatory firm-resettlement bar came into effect. See id. at 881 n.2.
60. Id. at 881 (citing Matter of Soleimani, 20 I. & N. Dec. 99 (BIA 1989)).

20041

An Offer of Firm Resettlement

forged British passport"; and the absence of "countervailing equities in favor of asylum." 6' The Board also considered his age,
health, and that "his stated reason for coming to the United States
62
[from Spain] was economic.."
Under a discretionary regime, the above reasons would arguably
provide fair grounds for denying Farbakhsh's asylum application. If
firm resettlement is but one factor among many to be weighed in
the exercise of discretion, then even in the absence of a genuine
offer of permanent resettlement, circumstances such as long residence in and family ties to a third state may militate against a
favorable exercise of discretion. But under the post-1990 regulatory (and now statutory) regime-whereby the inquiry focuses first
and foremost on the existence vel non of an offer of permanent
resettlement, which, if found, mandates rejection of an asylum
application-applying the Farbakhshanalysis would be anachronistic, indeed wrong. Whatever the equities, at the time Farbakhsh
applied for asylum, Spain had not made him an offer of permanent
resettlement. 63 Many adjudicators nonetheless continue to resolve
cases like Farbakhshby applying, in practice if not name, the anachronistic totality-of-the-circumstances rule.
These contemporary cases typically focus on two discrete issues:
first, whether the applicant remained in flight from persecution at
the time he filed his application; and second, whether the totality
of the circumstances indicates that his residence in a third state
constitutes firm resettlement. In practice, these issues frequently
overlap or become conflated in the course of the firm-resettlement
inquiry. Whether an alien remains in flight often depends on
whether he had resettled in a third state that extended him a certain level of rights and protection, enabling him to terminate his
flight. For that reason, a number of federal circuit courts have held
that where the INS furnishes evidence that suggests termination of
the applicant's flight from persecution, the burden of proof shifts
to the applicant to show-by reference to the totality of the circumstances-that he or she has not been firmly resettled. 64 Whatever
61. Id. at 882.
62. Id.
63. See id. at 880 (noting Farbakhsh's arguments that his application remained pending in Spain, where he had no right to work or attend school).
64. Cheo v. INS, 162 F.3d 1227, 1229-30 (9th Cir. 1998); see also Mussie v. INS, 172
F.3d 329, 331 (4th Cir. 1999) ("Once the 'evidence indicates' that an alien has been 'firmly
resettled,' the alien bears the 'burden of providing by a preponderance of the evidence'
that he has not been firmly resettled.") (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(c) (2) (ii)); cf Abdalla v.
INS, 43 F.3d 1397, 1399 (10th Cir. 1994) (finding the applicant's twenty-year residence in
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its merits as an evidentiary rule, 65 in practice this presumption can,
and often does, both modify and marginalize what should be the
paramount firm-resettlement inquiry: the existence vel non of a
legal offer of permanent resettlement. If an applicant stayed in a
third state for a long time or resided in a third state at a time not
reasonably proximate to his flight from persecution, then he must
prove that the state did not make him an offer of permanent resettlement. 66 That presumption is often demonstrably wrong as a matter of fact. More critically, as a matter of law, it tends in practice to
transform what should be a question distinct from the refugee-status inquiry into an additional criterion of refugee status.
B.

The Third Circuit's Decision in Abdille v. Ashcroft

In Abdille v. Ashcroft, 67 the Third Circuit became the first federal
court expressly to reject the totality-of-the-circumstances
approach-and, equally important, to label it as such. A Somalian
refugee applied for asylum after residing in South Africa with temporary, though evidently renewable, asylum status, which at that
time took the form of a two-year exemption from South Africa's
Aliens Control Act. 68 The Board held that he had been firmly reset-

tled on this basis. 69 The Third Circuit reversed and remanded,
adopting a construction of the firm-resettlement regulation based
on fidelity to its text and structure. 70 "It is readily evident from the
plain language of [8 C.F.R.] § 208.15," the court wrote, "that the
prime element in the firm resettlement inquiry is the existence vel
non of 'an offer of permanent resident status, citizenship, or some
the United Arab Emirates sufficient "to suggest permanent resident status" and to shift the
burden of proof to the applicant, where, unlike in Cheo or Mussie, the record disclosed the
existence of some form of official permit or "visa" authorizing legal residence).
65. I do not mean to question this allocation of the burdens of proof and persuasion
generally. Title 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(c) (2) (ii) provides that where the "evidence indicates"
that a bar to asylum applies, the applicant "shall have the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that" it does not. See, e.g., Abdille v. Ashcroft, 242 F.3d 477, 491
(3d Cir. 2001). In the context of firm resettlement, however, the application of this presumption can and frequently does obfuscate the appropriate inquiry. See infra Part IV.
66. Andriasian v. INS, 180 F.3d 1033, 1043 (9th Cir. 1999) ("In the absence of direct
evidence of an offer, a lengthy, undisturbed residence in a third country may establish a
rebuttable presumption that an individual has the right to return to that country and
remain there permanently.").
67.

242 F.3d 477 (3d Cir. 2001).

68.
69.

Id. at 481.
Id. at 482.

70.

Id.
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other type of permanent resettlement.' 7 v1 The Third Circuit
therefore rejected what it characterized as
[t]he alternative approach[, which] would have us consider the
existence of a government-issued offer as simply one component
of a broader firm resettlement inquiry according equal weight
to such factors as the alien's length of stay in a third country, the
economic and social ties that the alien develops in that country,
and the alien's intent . ... 72
That approach, the Third Circuit said, had been implicit in the
pre-Refugee Act decision of the D.C. Circuit in Chinese America Civil
Council v. Attorney General,73 and had been adopted in substance by
74
the far more recent decisions of the Eighth and Fourth Circuits.
At the same time, the Third Circuit equivocated somewhat. The
court said that it did not intend to foreclose the possibility that
where "the INS may not be able to secure direct evidence of a formal government offer of some type of permanent resettlement," it
may be permissible for the Service "to rely on non-offer-based factors," which "can serve as a surrogate for direct evidence of a formal offer of some type of permanent resettlement, if they rise to a
sufficient level of clarity and force." 75 The Abdille court declined to
specify in detail the nature and type of evidence that the INS may
be able to proffer to make out a prima facie case of firm resettlement in the absence of evidence of a formal offer. But the court
suggested that there may well be such cases, and totality-of-the-circumstances evidence should not be deemed per se irrelevant.
Unfortunately, what the Third Circuit thereby framed as the
exception-the need to make out a prima facie case of firm resettlement by indirect evidence rather than by evidence of a formal
offer-is in practice the rule. Asylum seekers seldom arrive with
documentation of a formal offer of permanent resettlement in a
third state. Those states that tend to receive large refugee flows
seldom treat refugees, either in law or practice, in an orderly manner that would enable adjudicators to conclude with confidence
that an offer of some kind of permanent resettlement had or had
not been extended. More often than not, the INS therefore resorts
to a variety of non-offer-based factors as evidence in an effort to
71. Id. at 485 (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 208.15 (2000)).
72. Id.
73. See id. (analyzing Chinese Am. Civil Council v. Attorney General, 566 F.2d 321
(D.C. Cir. 1977)).
74. Id. (citing and discussing Farbakhsh v. INS, 20 F.3d 877 (8th Cir. 1994), and Mussie v. INS, 172 F.3d 329 (4th Cir. 1999)).
75. Id. at 486-87 (citing Cheo v. INS, 162 F.3d 1227 (9th Cir. 1998)).
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establish a prima facie case of firm resettlement. And the "level of
clarity and force" 76 to which such evidence must rise in order to
compel the asylum applicant to disprove firm resettlement tends to
be very low.
Abdille remains a vital precedent, correctly decided in light of the
statutory and regulatory regime now in force. It clarifies the nature
of the modern firm-resettlement bar and the proper inquiry for
determining whether that bar applies. Yet the most difficult issues
presented by firm resettlement arise precisely in those circumstances that the Third Circuit addressed only in dicta. I do not
mean to suggest that the Abdille court should have decided any of
the myriad questions that could be presented in such circumstances. The court rightly resolved only those issues necessary to
decide the appeal and remanded the case for further findings of
fact that would enable the adjudicator to establish the existence vel
non of an offer. 77 But the Third Circuit's dicta on the questions it
declined to reach regrettably provide legal support for the very
practice-reliance on the totality-of-the-circumstances test and
non-offer-based factors-that its decision expressly rejects.
IV.

APPLICATION OF THE FIRM-RESETTLEMENT

BAR

IN PRACTICE

The vital difference between the Abdille rule and the totality-ofthe-circumstances test becomes clear when we descend from the
level of theory to that of practice. Few asylum cases reach the federal circuit courts. Published decisions on firm resettlement
remain sparse and generally uninformative vis-a-vis the typical
experience of asylum seekers faced with the firm-resettlement bar.
The BIA is the court of last resort for most asylum cases. Since
Soleimani, it has published no precedential decisions on firm
resettlement.
A better indicium of the operation of the firm-resettlement bar
in practice may be the INS's Basic Law Manual, upon which asylum
officers and immigration judges rely to guide their exercise of discretion. After paraphrasing the text of 8 C.F.R. § 208.15, the Manual instructs asylum officers that
[e]lements that should be considered in determining firm resettlement are: comparing the living conditions of the applicant to
the other residents of the country; housing; whether its [sic]
permanent or temporary; the types and extent of employment
made available; the legal right to hold property; the types of
76.
77.

Id. at 487.
See id. at 497.
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rights and privileges permitted compared to the other residocumentation, education, public
dences [sic] such as travel
78
relief, and naturalization.

The Manual, in other words, expressly instructs asylum officers
and immigration judges to employ the totality-of-the-circumstances
test. The "prime factor"-the existence vel non of a formal offer of
79
permanent resettlement-is nowhere mentioned.
As authority for the totality-of-the-circumstances test, the Manual
first cites 8 C.F.R. § 207.1(c). 8 0 That subsection governs the admission of refugees from outside the United States, not the asylum
process; and it sets forth a somewhat different definition of firmresettlement.8 1 The Manual then cites 8 C.F.R. § 208.15(b). 8 2 That
subsection is also inapposite. It enumerates factors that an adjudicator "shall consider" if, but only if, it is necessary to decide
whether, despite the existence of an offer of permanent resettlement, a third state has "substantially and consciously restricted" the
conditions of the applicant's residence.8 3 Finally, the Manual cites
two cases-Farbakhshv. INS and Matter of Soleimani-both of which
were decided under the discretionary firm-resettlement regime
that ended in 1990.84

The effect of the application of this test has been to distort the
firm-resettlement inquiry, waste administrative and judicial
resources, and needlessly burden meritorious applicants with the
obligation to establish the absence of firm resettlement as yet

78.

IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, THE BAsic LAW MANUAL 68 (1995).

79. See Abdille, 242 F.3d at 485 (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 208.15 (2000)).
80. Specifically, that subsection provides:
(c) Not firmly resettled. Any applicant who claims not to be firmly resettled in a
foreign country must establish that the conditions of his/her residence in that
country are so restrictive as to deny resettlement. In determining whether or not
an applicant is firmly resettled in a foreign country, the officer reviewing the matter shall consider the conditions under which other residents of the country live:
(1) Whether permanent or temporary housing is available to the refugee in the
foreign country; (2) nature of employment available to the refugee in the foreign
country; and (3) other benefits offered or denied to the refugee by the foreign
country which are available to other residents, such as (i) right to property ownership, (ii) travel documentation, (iii) education, (iv) public welfare, and (v)
citizenship.
8 C.F.R. § 207.1(c) (2003).
81. Id.
82. See BAsic LAw MANUAL, supra note 78, at 68 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 208.15(b)).
83. 8 C.F.R. § 208.15(b) (2003).
84. BAsic LAw MANUAL, supra note 78, at 68 (citing Farbakhsh v. INS, 20 F.3d 877 (8th
Cir. 1994), and Matter of Soleimani, 20 1. & N. Dec. 99 (BIA 1989)).
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another criterion of refugee status. Two examples will illustrate the
85
nature of the problem.
A.

Tibetan Refugees 'Firmly Resettled" in Nepal

About 3000 Tibetan refugees flee the People's Republic of China
annually.8 6 By geographic necessity, the vast majority must transit
through Nepal en route because they escape via the remote Himalayan regions that straddle Tibet and Nepal. For a variety of reasons, including lack of money, inability to obtain documents to
arrange travel onward, and the existence of family members or
friends in Nepal, many remain in Nepal for some time before finding the means to travel onward to a third state in which to seek
refuge.87
Nepal is not a party to the Refugee Conventions, nor has it
enacted any domestic refugee legislation. 88 It handles refugees on
an ad hoc basis. Under the Immigration Act of 1992,89 a refugee is
simply an alien or foreigner, a person not a citizen of Nepal. The
Act states that "[n]o foreigners shall be allowed to enter into and
stay in the Kingdom of Nepal without obtaining a passport and
visa." 90 It also authorizes the Ministry of Home Affairs to detain,
fine, and deport persons for violations. 9 1
Some 20,000 Tibetans nonetheless reside in Nepal pursuant to
an unwritten arrangement that allows Tibetans who arrived in or
before 1989 to remain in certain areas of the country. Still, they
enjoy no legal status under Nepalese law and remain stateless persons under international law. Nepal allows them to live in certain
isolated settlements, but they cannot own property, work, attend
school, or travel freely. Nor can they seek naturalization. The
Nepalese government also restricts their freedom of expression
85. The author serves as a member of the Board of Directors of TibetJustice Center,
in which capacity he provides expert affidavits on conditions for Tibetan refugees in Nepal
and India. He also has represented Tibetan and Congolese asylum applicants faced with
the firm-resettlement bar in, respectively, Nepal and South Africa, and conducted intake
interviews with a variety of refugees from African states.
86. TIBETJUSTICE CENTER, TIBET'S STATELESS NATIONALS, TIBETAN REFUGEES IN NEPAL 7
(2002).
87. See generally id.
88. Id. at 47 ("No statute or regulation of Nepal defines or even refers to 'refugees."').
89. The Immigration Act, No. 2049 (1992) (Nepal) (as amended by Immigration
(First Amendment) Act No. 2050); see also SURYA DHUNGEL ET AL., COMMENTARY ON THE
NEPALESE CONSTITUTION 86 (1998) (describing the government's broad discretion to regulate aliens' entry into Nepal).
90. The Immigration Act § 3(a) (Nepal).
91. Id. § 9, 10.
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because, particularly in recent years, it has been concerned that
any pro-Tibetan political expression within its borders threatens to
upset its delicate relationship with China. 9 2 Tibetans who have
arrived, and who continue to arrive, in flight from persecution
after 1989 cannot remain in Nepal at all. They must leave within
93
two weeks pursuant to an informal arrangement with UNHCR.
Many nonetheless remain illegally for some time, even though they
94
may face incarceration, fines, and deportation if apprehended.
Frequently, however, when a Tibetan asylum applicant has spent
any time in Nepal before entering the United States, the INS
alleges that he or she has been firmly resettled. Under the definition set forth in 8 C.F.R § 208.15, that allegation is manifestly false.
Nepal does not presently, nor did it ever, make Tibetans an offer of
some form of permanent resettlement. That the Service consistently alleges that Tibetan refugees who transited through Nepal
have been firmly resettled reveals the extent to which a totality-ofthe-circumstances approach continues to prevail in practice; for,
applying Abdille, there simply could be no question of firm resettlement. Because, however, the INS frequently considers the question
by looking at the totality of the circumstances, and because many
immigration judges and asylum officers likewise conflate the
§ 208.15(b) circumstantial inquiry with the offer-based inquiry
mandated by the regulations, Tibetan applicants often must establish the absence of firm resettlement for Tibetans in Nepal as part of
their prima facie case. In effect, that decision calculus reverses the
burden of proof. Both the regulations and the case law place the
initial burden on the Service to make a showing of firm
resettlement.
B.

African Refugees "FirmlyResettled" in South Africa

A similar problem arises for a variety of refugees from African
states who spend time in South Africa before seeking permanent
refuge elsewhere. In 2002, South Africa hosted more than 20,000
refugees, consisting of persons arriving in flight from Somalia,
92. See TIBET JUSTICE CENTER, supra note 86, at 2-6; 59-83.
93. See id. at 7-10; 88-120.
94. See, e.g., Tibet Information Network, Tibetan Prisoners in Nepal Seek Royal Pardon,
Feb. 15, 2002, at http://www.tibetinfo.co.uk/news-updates/2002/1502.htm; Tibet Information Network, Decline in Refugee Numbers as China and Nepal tighten Security on Tibetan
Border, Jan. 22, 2002, at http://www.tibetinfo.co.uk/news-updates/2002/0201.htm; Tibet
Information Network, Tibetans Sent Back Across the Border as PressureIncreases on Nepal, Dec.
20, 2000, at http://www.tibetinfo.co.uk/news-updates/nu201200.htm; see generally TIBET
JUSTICE CENTER, supra note 86, at 105-10; 114-20.
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Angola, Congo-Brazzaville, and a variety of other African states. 95
Again, for a broad variety of reasons-including, most commonly,
lack of money, inability to arrange travel onward, and in South
Africa's case, a legal system of refugee protection that holds out the
promise of permanent resettlement, but seldom delivers it-many
refugees must remain there for some time before seeking refuge
elsewhere.
South Africa ratified the 1951 Convention and its 1967 Protocol
on January 12, 1996.96 Before April 1, 2000, however, it made refugee status determinations on an essentially ad hoc basis. 9 7 Rampant corruption, bribery, and the absence of uniform standards for
adjudicating asylum claims plagued this informal system. 98 On
April 1, 2000, South Africa implemented the Refugees Act No.
19544 (No. 130) of 1998 by promulgating the Refugee Regulations
2000. 9 9 Under this system, asylum seekers must first apply for refugee status at one of the Refugee Reception Centres. There, a Refugee Reception Officer will interview the applicant. If satisfied as to
the prima facie viability of his identity and claim, the officer will
provide the applicant with an "Asylum Seeker Temporary Permit,"
also known as a "Section 22 Permit."'10 0 The applicant must then
return on the date indicated on the permit-thirty days later-for
an interview with a Refugee Status Determination Officer.10 1 The
Act authorizes officers "from time to time [to] extend the period
for which the permit has been issued,"10 2 and lengthy delays are
commonplace. Asylum seekers often wait for months or even years
03
for their initial status-determination interview.
In theory, a Refugee Status Determination Officer must determine an asylum seeker's claim within 180 days after the applicant
files "a completed asylum application with a Refugee Reception
95. U.S. Committee for Refugees, World Refugee Survey, 2002 Country Report: South
Africa, at http://www.refugees.org/world/countryrpt/africa/20O2/southafrica.cfm.
96. Telephone interview with Jaya Elizabeth Ramji, former Robert L. Bernstein Fellow in
International Human Rights, University of Witswatersand Refugee Law Clinic, Republic of
South Africa (Feb. 27, 2003).
97. Id.
98.

See generally HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, "PROHIBITED PERSONS": ABUSE OF UNDOCUAND REFUGEES IN SOUTH AFRICA (1998), at http://
www.hrw.org/reports98/sareport.htm.
MENTED MIGRANTS, ASyLUM-SEEKERS,

99.

Refugees Act No. 19544 (No. 130) of 1998, Dec. 2, 1998 (S. Mr.); Refugee Regula-

tions 2000, Vol. 418, No. 21075, Apr. 6, 2000 (S. Mr.).
100. See Refugees Act 22.
101. See Refugee Regulations 3.
102. Refugees Act 22(3).
103. Telephone interview with Jaya Elizabeth Ramji (Feb. 27, 2003).
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Officer." 10 4 In practice, it takes months and often years for an asylum seeker to obtain a status determination interview in the first
place, and months more to receive a decision. In the interim, asylum seekers cannot work or attend school. Most struggle to subsist
while their asylum applications remain pending. Xenophobia and
10 5
violence against refugees reportedly pervade South Africa.
Even if an asylum seeker receives asylum after a refugee statusdetermination interview, it does not provide him with the right to
acquire permanent legal status. It only permits him to remain in
South Africa for two years.1 0 6 Then, he must reapply for refugee
status and establish his claim de novo in a new proceeding.10 7 In
this proceeding, the applicant bears the burden of proof to establish that the conditions that prompted his flight from persecution
remain unchanged. Then, two years later, the applicant must again
establish his asylum claim de novo. 0 8 After five years of continuous
residence with refugee status, an applicant can apply for permanent residence, but the Standing Committee of the Department of
Home Affairs must certify that he will remain a refugee "indefinitely." 10 9 The applicant bears this extraordinarily high burden of
proof. As of January 24, 2003, according to South African lawyer
Abeda Bhamjee, Director of the Refugee Unit at the University of
Witswatersand Refugee Law Clinic, no refugee had ever received
permanent resident status from the South African government.1 1 0
Again, applying AbdilLe or a similar offer-based test as required by
the federal regulations, seldom can there be any question that an
otherwise qualified refugee who resided temporarily in South
Africa before seeking refuge in the United States has not been
firmly resettled. But because the totality-of-the-circumstances test
continues to predominate in practice, refugees who resided for any
104. Refugee Regulations
3.
105. See HuMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 98.
106. Refugee Regulations
15(2).
107. Telephone interview with Jaya Elizabeth Ramji (Feb. 27, 2003).
108. Refugee Regulations
15(2)-(4); see also Refugees Act 5(1)(c) (refugee status
ceases if "he or she can no longer continue to refuse to avail himself or herself of the
protection of the country of his or her nationality because the circumstances in connection
with which he or she has been recognized as a refugees have ceased to exist and no other
circumstances have arisen which justify his or her continued recognition as a refugee").
109. See Refugees Act 27(c) (refugee may "apply for an immigration permit . . . after
five years' continuous residence in the Republic [of South Africa] from the date on which
he or she was granted asylum, if the Standing Committee certifies that he or she will
remain a refugee indefinitely") (emphasis added). In theory, this determination may be
made from the outset; in practice, the Department of Home Affairs seldom, if ever, does
that. Telephone interview with Jaya Elizabeth Ramji (Feb. 27, 2003).
110. Telephone interview with Jaya Elizabeth Ramji (Feb. 27, 2003).
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length of time in South Africa frequently must establish the
absence of firm resettlement as part of their prima facie case. And
because unambiguous evidence of an offer of permanent resettlement in South Africa rarely exists-typically, because no such offer
has been made-the INS resorts to supplying the court with totality-of-the-circumstances evidence about, inter alia, the length of the
applicant's residence in South Africa, employment and living conditions, family ties, and other non-offer-based factors. Those factors, however, should only become relevant if the adjudicator must
make an 8 C.F.R. § 208.15(b) inquiry-that is, if the adjudicator
must decide whether, notwithstanding the existence of an offer of
permanent resettlement, a third state has "substantially and consciously restricted" an applicant's conditions of residence in that
state such that the mandatory bar should not apply.1 1'
In short, in both of the above examples, what the Third Circuit
framed as the exception-the need at times to make out a prima
facie case of firm resettlement by indirect evidence rather than by
evidence of a formal offer-in practice becomes the rule. More
often than not, the INS resorts to a variety of non-offer-based factors as evidence in an effort to establish a prima facie case of firm
resettlement. And more often than not, immigration judges and
asylum officers set the bar of "clarity and force" 1 12 to which this
evidence must rise in order to compel the asylum applicant to disprove firm resettlement at an inappropriately low level. Firm resettlement effectively becomes, not a bar to asylum for otherwise
eligible refugees, with respect to which the Service bears the burden to make out a prima facie case, but rather an additional criterion of refugee status, which the applicant bears the burden to
disprove to establish his or her eligibility. Abdille thereby unwittingly provides legal authority for the very general practice-reliance on the totality-of-the-circumstances test and non-offer-based
factors-that its decision expressly rejects.
V.

CONCLUSION

Asylum reflects a profound moral judgment made by the international community in the aftermath of World War II: that persons
persecuted for certain reasons merit third-state protection. International law therefore protects certain shared values-the right to be
free from persecution on account of political opinion, religion,
111. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
112. See Abdille v. Ashcroft, 242 F.3d 477, 486-87 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing Cheo v. INS,
162 F.3d 1227 (9th Cir. 1998)).
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race, nationality, or membership in a particular social groupthrough an international regime that shields and empowers persons, whatever their nationality, persecuted for these reasons. The
domestic laws of states parties to the Refugee Conventions should
conform to and enable the effective operation of this regime. That
means, among other things, focusing asylum adjudications on persecution, not on an ad hoc totality-of-the-circumstances judgment
about a variety of extraneous economic and legal circumstances
prevailing in third states and an indeterminate set of minimal
rights and protections that such states may or may not afford to
different categories of refugees. Under U.S. law and regulations,
those considerations matter, if at all, only to the extent that they
inform the question whether a third state that did offer an asylum
conseeker permanent resettlement nonetheless "substantially and
1 13
residence.
her
or
his
of
conditions
sciously restricted" the
The prevailing totality-of-the-circumstances test tends in practice
needlessly and unduly to burden genuine asylum seekers and to
waste judicial and administrative resources. This incorrect, if not
disingenuous, construction of a domestic regulation, perhaps motivated by a desire to curtail what may be deemed by some to be an
undesirable flow of asylum seekers, obscures rather than cures the
perceived problem. Virtually all refugees must travel through one
or more third states en route to permanent refuge. To make their
eligibility for asylum dependent on an additional criterionnamely, an ad hoc totality-of-the-circumstances judgment about an
indeterminate level of available rights or protection in those third
states-not only fails to respect the law and regulations, it also
undermines the paramount purpose of asylum law: to establish a
robust regime of international protection for defined categories of
persons deprived of national protection.

113.

See 8 C.F.R. § 208.15(b) (2003).

